OAuth2令牌重用检测失败允许重放攻击
OAuth2 token reuse detection failure allows replay attack
ID: security/oauth2-token-reuse-detection-failure-allows-replay-attack
版本兼容性
| 版本 | 状态 | 引入 | 弃用 | 备注 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| OAuth2.0 | active | — | — | — |
| Spring Security 5.6+ | active | — | — | — |
| Keycloak 22.0.0 | active | — | — | — |
| Auth0 2024.02 | active | — | — | — |
根因分析
当授权服务器未跟踪授权代码或访问令牌是否已被使用时,攻击者可以重放捕获的令牌以获得未经授权的访问。
English
When the authorization server does not track whether an authorization code or access token has already been used, an attacker can replay a captured token to gain unauthorized access.
官方文档
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-10.5解决方案
-
Implement token reuse detection on the authorization server: store a flag or timestamp for each authorization code and access token, and reject requests that use an already-used code or token. Example in Spring Security: configure OAuth2AuthorizationService with a persistent store that marks codes as used.
-
Use short-lived authorization codes (e.g., 1 minute) and access tokens (e.g., 5 minutes) combined with reuse detection to minimize the replay window.
-
Implement token binding (e.g., via DPoP or mTLS) to tie tokens to a specific client, preventing replay from other clients.
无效尝试
常见但无效的做法:
-
70% 失败
Relying on short token lifetimes (e.g., 5 minutes) does not prevent replay within that window; an attacker can replay the token immediately after capture.
-
60% 失败
Using a nonce in the request is insufficient if the authorization server does not track nonces per token; an attacker can reuse the same nonce.
-
50% 失败
Encrypting the token does not prevent replay because the attacker can still send the same encrypted token.